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Abstract 
Insurance companies are financially responsible for a substantial portion of the 
losses associated with risky activities in the economy. The more insurers can 
lower the risks posed by their insureds, the more competitively they can price 
their policies, and the more customers they can attract.  Thus, competition 
forces insurers to be private regulators of risk. To that end, insurers deploy a 
range of techniques to encourage their insureds to reduce the risks of their 
insured activities, from charging experience-rated premiums to giving special 
premium discounts to insureds who make specific behavioral changes designed 
to reduce risk.  Somewhat paradoxically, however, tort law discourages insurers 
from engaging in the direct regulation of their insureds’ behavior.  Under 
longstanding tort principles, if an insurer “undertakes” to provide serious risk-
reduction services to an insured, the insurer can be found to have a duty of 
reasonable care and, should that duty be breached, held liable for any harms 
caused to third parties. This application of tort principles to insurance 
companies could be contributing to the moral hazard problem often associated 
with insurance—the tendency of insurance to cause risk to increase rather than 
decrease.  This Article explores this problem and analyzes a number of ways to 
encourage insurers to regulate—from insurer-specific Good Samaritan statutes 
(which we might call a “carrot”) to the expansion of tort principles to create an 
affirmative duty on the part of insurers to regulate (which would definitely be a 
“stick”). What combination of carrots and sticks produces the optimal insurer 
incentives to regulate their insureds’ behavior?  That is the question the Article 
addresses. 
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I. Introduction 
It is well known that insurance companies are financial intermediaries 
that transfer and spread risk.  Specifically, insurers enter into contractual 
arrangements with risk-averse individuals and corporations in which a broad 
range of hazards, or sometimes a specific set of hazards, is shifted from the 
latter to the former.  The insurers, who themselves are corporations owned by 
private shareholders, spread this risk across their policyholders through 
premiums that reflect average policyholder risk.  Thus, each policyholder pays 
a relatively small and certain premium to the pool in exchange for shifting the 
risk of a large loss to the pool.  The risk-transferring and risk-spreading 
functions compose the standard picture of insurance markets.   
But insurers do more than this. Insurance companies also serve as 
active risk regulators.
1
  In many of the same ways that government agencies 
monitor and place limits on the risky behavior of individuals and businesses 
within their jurisdictions, insurance companies also monitor and place limits on 
the risky behavior of the people and firms whom they insure.  In fact, because 
insurance is a practical if not a legal requirement with respect to some 
activities, insurers for those activities function as gatekeepers, determining who 
gets to engage in the risky activity and who does not.  Homeownership, for 
example, is not possible for most people without home-mortgage financing, 
which in turn is not available to anyone who does not first purchase 
homeowners’ insurance.  Similarly, one cannot legally drive a car in most states 
without first purchasing the statutory minimum amount of liability insurance.  It 
is also difficult if not impossible to be actively engaged in a profession—law, 
medicine, engineering, whatever—if one does not have professional liability 
insurance coverage, purchased either individually or through one’s employer.   
In addition to keeping the gate to much commercial activity, insurers, 
like government regulators, also have more subtle regulatory tools.  For 
example, auto insurers charge higher premiums for vehicles that pose a 
statistically greater chance of being involved in an accident or that are more 
expensive to repair or more likely to cause harm to others if an accident occurs. 
                                                          
*
 Wade H. and Dores M. McCree Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan 
Law School.   
1
 See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How 
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012) 
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Such risk-differentiated premiums create incentives at the margin for auto 
purchasers to take into account the risks associated with their vehicle choices.  
Likewise, when auto insurance companies adjust premiums based on the 
accident experience of individual drivers or alter rates based on the way in 
which drivers operate their vehicles or based on the numbers of miles the 
insured drives, the insurer is in effect regulating driver behavior--forcing 
drivers to internalize the expected value of the accident-costs associated with 
her driving choices.  In this way, auto insurance premiums—all insurance 
premiums—can be viewed as cost-internalizing Pigouvian taxes, similar to 
taxes on carbon emissions, only here administered by private insurance 
companies rather than by a government agency.  
An argument can be made that this is all to the good.  We should want 
insurers to act as risk regulators.  Sometimes regulation is needed, whether 
because of externalities or cognitive biases or some other market failure.  
Moreover, there are times when private regulation through insurance can be 
superior to government regulation.  This happens when insurers are able to take 
advantage of their two primary institutional advantages over government 
regulators: First, private insurers have relatively cheap access to highly relevant 
risk-related information; second, private insurers are motivated by profit to find 
clever and practical ways to reduce risks.  These two factors explain not only 
why regulation by insurance is often desirable, but also why it is common.   
There is one type of regulation by insurers, however, that is 
surprisingly uncommon. It is analogous to what the literature on government 
regulation might call “direct regulation” or “input regulation” or “command-
and-control regulation.”  For example, when the EPA inspects a coal-fired 
power plant and issues an order specifying steps that the operator of the plant 
must take to minimize harmful emissions into the atmosphere, such an 
intervention is a quintessential example of direct regulation.  Direct regulation 
is generally considered the policy instrument of choice only if the regulator has 
vast quantities of information regarding the regulated risk. Insurers, because of 
their access to information regarding insured risks, are uniquely suited to 
engage in direct regulation. Insurers, for example, could inspect their insureds’ 
activities and recommend specific steps that the insureds should take to reduce 
the risks that they pose to themselves and to others.  Moreover, insurers could 
give those recommendations teeth by linking them to premium adjustments or 
by making them a condition of coverage. 
Although insurers do engage in some direct regulation (as discussed in 
more detail below), they do surprisingly little of it, given the potential benefits. 
And the reason for this, or one potential reason for it, is surprising as well: 
Insurers’ incentive to engage in direct regulation of their insureds’ risky 
behavior may be inhibited by a concern about potential tort liability.  Under 
well accepted common law principles of tort, if a party undertakes to render a 
service that is expected to reduce the risk of harm to a third party, then the party 
providing the service has a duty to take reasonable care in engaging in this 
undertaking.
2
  Some states have enacted statutes that eliminate this duty as it 
applies to insurance companies, or as it applies to a subset of insurance 
                                                          
2
 Restatement (Third) Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 42.  The 
Third Restatement is a revision of the language from the Restatement (Second) Torts § 
324A.   
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companies such as workers’ compensation insurers.  Most states, however, 
have no such “insurer Good Samaritan laws,” but have instead left in place the 
common law cause of action, sometimes referred to as the tort of “negligent 
inspection.” What’s more, in most of those states, the doctrine of negligent 
inspection has in fact been applied to insurance companies.  Therefore, existing 
tort doctrine in most states does in fact pose a risk to insurers who engage in 
direct regulation of their insureds: if they regulate poorly, they may be held 
responsible for the consequences.  
Whether or not exposing insurers to such tort liability is a good thing 
depends on tradeoffs that are familiar to the economic analyst of law.  On the 
one hand, it can be argued that applying the negligent inspection rule to insurers 
has at least two potentially negative effects:  insurers are discouraged from 
engaging in socially desirable regulation of risk; and insurers who do engage in 
such regulation find it necessary to raise their premiums to cover the additional 
tort risk to themselves, thereby pricing some insureds out of the market for 
coverage.  If these to effects are large, perhaps more states should enact insurer 
Good Samaritan laws.  On the other hand, it can also be argued that applying 
the negligent inspection rule to insurers enhances efficient deterrence by 
encouraging those insurers who undertake to provide safety inspections the 
incentive to do so in a reasonable way, an incentive that the market alone does 
not provide (for reasons to be discussed further below).   If that is so, perhaps 
the existing insurer Good Samaritan statutes should be repealed.   
Of course, enactment or repeal of insurer Good Samaritan statutes are 
not the only two options.  There are both more extreme and less extreme 
alternatives. For example, if it is the case that insurers are in the best position to 
prevent certain accidents from happening—if insurers are the “cheapest cost 
avoiders”—it is conceivable that courts or legislatures could create an 
affirmative duty on the part of insurers to regulate—to provide specific safety 
recommendations or mandates when doing so would constitute reasonable care. 
Such a rule could be seen as a major expansion of traditional tort law, which 
generally imposes no affirmative “duty to rescue” others who are in danger, not 
even when doing so would impose little risk to the rescuer.  Alternatively, a 
duty imposed on insurers to regulate could instead be seen as a hybrid of the 
existing exception to the no-duty-to-rescue rule, specifically, the exception for 
situations in which the tort defendant has a “special relationship” with the 
victim.   
 This Article explores all of these possibilities.  Part II provides a more 
detailed discussion of why insurers might be viewed as effective private 
regulators of the risks posed by their insureds.  Part III surveys the existing 
doctrine dealing with negligent inspection liability, as applied both to trade 
associations and insurance companies—both examples of private risk 
regulators.  Part IV addresses the normative questions:  how would insurers 
respond to various alternative tort rules with respect to direct regulation by 
insurers of their insureds and what rule or combination of rules would create 
the optimal incentive structure.   This Article builds on a number of literatures, 
including the previous work on trade-association and insurer liability for 
4
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negligent standard setting and negligent inspections
3
 as well as the literatures 
on vicarious and gatekeeper liability
4
 and the duty to rescue.
5
  
II. Insurers as Private Regulators 
 Economic theories of regulation seek to identify the situations in which 
market failures give rise to the need for government intervention in the 
economy and what sort of interventions make the most sense, whether it be 
command-and-control regulations, performance standards, cost-internalizing 
taxes, or some combination.
6
  Whatever regulatory intervention is chosen, 
effective regulation requires that the regulatory decisionmaker have enormous 
amounts of information about the behavior of the regulated parties and about 
the consequences of that behavior.  After all, the regulator must identify the 
optimal standards of conduct and the appropriate penalties for breaching those 
standards, both of which are information-intensive inquiries.  This is why 
economic theories of rulemaking focus on the comparative abilities of different 
regulatory institutions –courts as compared with agencies, for example—to 
gather and process risk-relevant information.
7
   
Effective regulation also requires proper motivation.  The regulator 
must have an incentive to produce and enforce regulations that maximize social 
welfare.  Many, perhaps most, individuals who work for government agencies 
generally have such an incentive.
8
  That is, however, not always true. In fact, it 
is almost a cliché to point out that regulatory agencies often have incentives 
                                                          
3
 Two important articles on the liability of trade associations are Ralph G. Wellington 
& Vance G. Camisa, The Trade Associations and Product Safety Standards: Of Good 
Samaritans and Liability, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 37 (1988); and Peter H. Schuck, Tort 
Liability to Those Injured by Negligent Accreditation Decisions, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 185 (1994). There have been a number of articles written on negligent inspection 
liability of insurers. James F. Reddoch, Jr., Insurer’s Liability for Negligent 
Performance of Voluntary Safety Inspections 3 CUMB. L. REV. 118 (1972); Michael 
Braden, An Insurer’s Liability to Third Parties for Negligent Inspection, 66 KY. L. J. 
919 (1977); Victor Goldberg, Tort Liability for Negligent Inspection by Insurers, in 
RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: A RESEARCH ANNUAL 76 (Richard O. Zerbe, 
editor) (1980); Amy Schulman, Recent Developments in Self-Insurance and Risk 
Management, 32 TORT & INS. L. J. 479 (1995); John Dwight Ingraham, Liability of 
Insurers for Negligent Inspection of Insured Premises, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 623 (2002). 
4
 See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L. J. 1231 
(1984); and Renier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. E. & O. 53, 57 (1986). 
5
 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: 
An Economic Study of Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978); and Saul Le.vmore, 
Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of 
Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986) 
6
 E.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982). 
7
 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 510–11 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); 
Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 
RAND J. ECON. 271 (1984); and Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law 
Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 255 (1993). 
8
 See, e.g., STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY 
OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008). 
5
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that do not align perfectly with the public interest.
9
  Although the problem can 
be exaggerated, agency capture continues to be a thing.  This is especially true 
in situations in which the regulated parties are relatively few in number with 
relatively homogeneous interests and are relatively well off, while the 
beneficiaries of the regulation are the diffuse public.
10
  In such situations, 
government agencies can have a tendency to regulate primarily in the interest of 
the parties they are regulating, which may well conflict with what maximizes 
overall social welfare.  Moreover, even without agency capture, there can be a 
lack of motivation when agencies are not disciplined by market forces in the 
way that private firms are. 
Many commentators have noted that insurance companies can and do 
act as regulators of risk.
11
  Building on this scholarship, Omri Ben-Shahar and I 
have argued that insurance companies in some settings have a comparative 
advantage over government regulators of risk, having to do with both 
information and motivation.
12
 The informational advantage that insurers have 
results from the nature of private insurance markets.  Because insurers are 
providing risk shifting and risk distributing services to their insureds, they need 
to keep track of risk-relevant data for purposes of pricing.   This information is 
gathered at the underwriting stage (when the insurer must decide whether to 
insure a particular insured and at what price) and at the claims stage (when the 
insurer decides whether and how much to pay out for each claim that is filed).  
Each insurer has its own data that pertains to the pool of insureds that it insures.  
In addition, the industry gathers and pools information through institutions 
called insurance “rating bureaus” or “rating agencies.”  
This is the sort of information that a regulator would obviously find 
useful.  Indeed, such information—about the risks presented by particular 
                                                          
9
 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335 
(1974). 
10
 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971). 
11
 Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120, 120–22 (1982) 
(exploring the relationship between tort law and insurance and how insurance has 
potential to created optimal accident-prevention incentives); KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, 
DISTRIBUTING RISK 57 (1986) (coining the term “surrogate regulation” when describing 
the (then new) regulatory role being foisted on liability insurers to regulate toxic tort 
and environmental risks); DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS 
THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER (2002); Tom Baker, Bonded Import Safety Warranties, 
IN IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 215 (Cary 
Coglianese et al. eds., 2009) (arguing for reliance on insurers to police food safety); Jon 
D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic 
Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 145–53 (1990) (arguing 
for shifting the regulatory function of product safety to products liability insurers 
through adoption of strict products liability); Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: 
Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-Visited, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 48–
60 (2002) (arguing for use of insurance to regulate accuracy of financial statements). 
For a detailed proposal to privatize the regulation of medical care that raises many of 
the same arguments that have been raised in support of using private insurers as 
regulators of risk more generally, see Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 543 (2011). 
12
 Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance 
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012). This Part draws heavily from 
this Article. 
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insureds and about the effect on those risks of the insureds’ choices and 
actions—is arguably essential to effective regulation.  What’s more, such 
information is costly to collect. Assuming insurers must collect the information 
in any event, it would be entirely duplicative and wasteful to have government 
regulators gather all the same information as well. This does not mean that the 
government should not also gather risk related information.  Rather the point is 
that, for those risks that have a thriving, competitive, individually underwritten 
insurance market, private insurers will have access to a level of risk-related 
information that would not be cost justified for the government to collect. 
Insurers also invest resources specifically to identify the best ways for 
insureds to reduce their losses.  For example, a group of large property/casualty 
insurance companies have for many years operated a research institute that tests 
and rates the crashworthiness of automobiles, producing information that is, or 
can be, used by consumers in making choices about which cars to buy.
13
  More 
recently, insurers have begun a similar effort with respect to risks of damage to 
property, especially damage from disasters.
14
  In both of these cases, the 
information that is generated is shared with consumers generally and, in some 
cases, with policy makers.  These types of safety research-and-development 
initiatives are not unique to insurance companies and are sometimes replicated 
by the government.  Nevertheless, they do contribute to the overall stock of 
information that insurers have, which no other institution can claim. 
Insurance companies also have a strong incentive to help their insureds 
reduce the risks they face, an incentive that government agencies do not have 
and that is (mostly) consistent with the public interest.  Liability insurers are 
obviously on the hook contractually when their insureds negligently cause harm 
to others. Therefore, the insurer that fails to find the most cost-effective way of 
reducing the risks posed by its insureds, and thereby reduce its premiums, may 
find itself losing customers to its more innovative competitors who can offer 
cost savings.  Even absent strong competition among insurers, an insurance 
company has an incentive to maximize its own profits by minimizing its costs, 
which means, after the insurer has collected the premiums, finding ways to 
reduce the expected payouts to insureds.   
Besides their unique access to information and their competitive 
motivation, insurers also have access to a number of especially effective 
regulatory tools.
15
  For example, deductibles and copayments, insurance 
contract terms that impose some portion of every loss on insureds rather than 
on insurers, can be understood as devices to align insureds’ accident-prevention 
incentives with those of their insurers.  Similarly, exclusions impose on 
insureds all of certain types of losses, often losses from particular types of 
                                                          
13
 http://www.iihs.org/.  
14
 https://www.disastersafety.org/.  
15
 Other scholars have pointed this out. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Thomas O. Farrish, 
Liability Insurance and the Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 292 
(Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) (identifying and categorizing the various methods of 
regulation used by insurers); Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The 
Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 541 (2009) (same); Haitao Yin, 
Howard Kunreuther & Matthew White, Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: 
Does the Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J. L. & 
ECON. 325 (2011) (same). 
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excluded causes, such as intentional wrongdoing.  While the ex post effect of 
such exclusions can be draconian (i.e., total loss of coverage), the ex ante effect 
is to strongly incentivize insureds not to engage in certain types of behavior—
such as intentionally causing the loss.   
One of the most powerful regulatory tools wielded by insurers is the 
insurance premium itself.  Profit-maximizing insurers seek to charge premiums 
equal to the expected costs of the individuals and firms they insure—that is, 
premium which are differentiated based on the risk presented by each insured. 
Failure to charged risk-differentiated premiums can result in the loss of low-
risk customers, who will find paying the undifferentiated premiums to be a bad 
deal.  Such low-risk parties may either shift to competing insurers who have 
more accurately priced policies or, depending on how risk averse the parties are 
(and how inaccurate the premiums), opt for being self- or uninured. The 
departure of low-risk insureds from an insurance pool then leads to higher 
average costs for the remaining pool participants, which can then induce the 
previously-average-but-now-low-risk insureds in turn to drop out.  And so on 
until, in the worst case (though perhaps unlikely) scenario, the insurance pool 
“unravels” entirely.16 To prevent all of this from happening, insurers attempt to 
charge premiums that reflect the differences in the risks posed by particular 
insureds.
17
  And when an insured’s risks change over time, so must the insurer’s 
premiums. Such premium adjustments require information, which the insurers 
gather through experience-rating, based on the loss-experience of particular 
insureds during the previous insured period, as well as through pre-loss risk-
rating, based on information about insureds gathered during the initial 
underwriting or renewal processes.   
The efficiency benefit of having risk-differentiated premiums has to do 
with cost-internalization.  That is, to the extent insurance premium differentials 
reflect risk-related choices made by insureds—so that insureds can, by altering 
their behavior, reduce or increase their insurance premiums—those premiums 
operate as a sort of cost-internalizing, Pigouvian tax, not unlike a pollution tax.  
Insureds, because of the obligation to pay the premiums, are forced to take into 
account the full social costs of their decisions, which they might otherwise 
externalize. 
Similar cost-internalization can be achieved by insurers with 
deductibles and copayments.  These are contractual provisions that leave the 
insured responsible for covering some portion of their insured losses.  
Economists have long known that such cost sharing can be efficient in 
insurance contracts, precisely because perfectly individualized and risk-
adjusted insurance premiums are not possible, given the amount of information 
                                                          
16
 George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort law, 96 YALE L. J. 
1521 (1987).  There is a strong case to be made that this sort of “death spiral” 
unraveling is rare and unlikely.  Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance 
Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L. J. 1223 (2004). 
17
 Note that this practice of risk-adjusted individualized premiums is consistent with the 
idea of risk shifting from insured to insured.  That is, a risk-averse insured would rather 
pay an insurance premium that accurately reflects his or her particular risk than to bear 
the risk itself, assuming they can afford to pay the premium. 
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that would be required.
18
  A deductible automatically forces the insured to 
internalize the costs of their activities, up to the amount of the deductible.  
Thus, an insurance contract that contains a deductible can induce an insured to 
make particular investments to reduce risks, even when the insurer is not able to 
monitor the insured’s behavior.  Deductibles work best for small but highly 
effective care level investments:  for example, when an insured can virtually 
eliminate a particular risk (and thus the risk of having to pay out it the 
deductible) by making a minor investment in accident prevention.
19
   
In addition to incentive-based regulation through the use of premiums 
and deductibles and the like, insurers also engage in some forms of direct safety 
input regulation, similar to what the EPA does when it tells a power plant how 
specifically to alter its practices to reduce emissions; or what OSHA does when 
it inspects a workplace and identifies safety improvements that need to be 
made. Insurers, especially liability insurers—workers’ compensation, products 
liability, commercial property liability—are in a position to do this sort of 
inspection work reasonably well.  As Victor Goldberg once put the point, “a 
tied sale of insurance cum inspection has very attractive properties.  By tying 
inspection to insurance the parties make the inspector’s compensation 
contingent on upon its success.”20   
This regulation by insurer inspection developed first with boiler and 
machinery first-party coverage (discussed further below), but insurer 
inspections now are used to some extent with range of types of coverage.  Most 
large property/casualty insurance companies have an office or department 
whose primary job is to educate insureds about how to reduce risks. These 
services have a number of different titles: “loss control,”21 “loss prevention,”22  
“risk control,”23 or even “risk engineering.”24   
I have just laid out the most optimistic version of the insurance-as-
regulation story.  The truth is more complex, of course, and considerably less 
                                                          
18
 Economists have famously noted that deductibles can be used to induce insureds to 
voluntarily sort into high-risk and low-risk groups, when expressly risk-differentiated 
premiums is not practical.  Thus, under certain assumptions, low-risk insureds would 
agree to a contract that contains a deductible but relatively low premiums, while high-
risk insureds would prefer no deductible with a higher premium.  The seminal article 
showing this result is Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive 
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. 
ECON. 629 (1976). 
19
 See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. 
IN. L. J. 29, 66 (2012)(explaining how deductible can induce insureds to make low-cost 
risk-reducing changes in behavior). 
20
 Victor Goldber, Tort Liability for Negligent Inspection by Insurers, in RESEARCH IN 
LAW AND ECONOMICS: A RESEARCH ANNUAL 73 (Richard O. Zerbe, editor) (1980). 
21
 State Farm:  http://www.farmers.com/business/loss-control/; The Hartford: 
http://www.thehartford.com/loss-control/; Berkshire Hathaway: 
https://www.bhhc.com/workers-compensation/services/loss-control.aspx. 
22
 AIG:  http://www.aig.com/kw-property-loss-prevention_821_330338.html; and 
http://www.aig.com/loss-prevention-services_3171_444286.html.   
23
 Travelers: https://www.travelers.com/business-insurance/risk-control/index.aspx; 
Liberty Mutual: http://www.libertymutualgroup.com/business-insurance/insurance-
news/risk-management.    
24
 Zurich: http://www.zurichna.com/zna/risk_engineering/risk_engineering.htm.   
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rosy.  While insurance companies have some comparative advantage as risk 
regulators in certain settings, they also have limitations. First, unlike a 
government agency, an insurance company has no power to compel action 
under threat of force; insurers have only the threat of premium increases or 
coverage cancelation or other contractual remedies.  Second, those contractual 
remedies are far from ideal. Although some insurers adjust premiums based on 
their insureds’ risky choices, some do not, or they do so only minimally, 
because of high information and transaction costs.
25
 Third, to the extent that 
insurance companies do not get actively involved in the regulation of their 
insureds, whether through premiums adjustments or mandatory inspections or 
whatever, insurance can have a counterproductive effect on incentives. 
Insurance can, and sometimes does, undermine incentives to reduce risk.  It is 
common knowledge that insurance can produce moral hazard; and any attempt 
to use insurance as a form of regulation must take this possibility into 
account.
26
  Fourth, with respect to liability insurance in particular, if the 
insured’s activity poses a risk of harm to others that exceeds the value of the 
insured’s assets (in which case the insured is said to be “judgment proof”), 
insurance cannot perform well as a regulatory mechanism, unless it is 
accompanied with a coverage mandate.  Fifth, and most obvious, the interests 
of insurance companies—even in reasonably competitive markets—can and do 
sometimes diverge from the interests of society generally. This is why 
insurance companies and insurance contracts are themselves regulated.  For one 
example, bad-faith law is necessary to counteract insurers’ financial incentive 
to behave opportunistically with respect to their insureds in situations in which 
market forces alone are not likely to punish such opportunism.
27
   Another 
example would be the problem of loss externalization by insurers, through the 
use of annually renewed contracts.
28
 
                                                          
25
 In addition, many premium adjustments have nothing to do with insureds’ choices, 
but rather are based on more or less immutable characteristics. For example, while 
significant premium discounts for driving fewer miles is likely to have efficient 
behavioral effects, discouraging unnecessary trips in the car, premium differentials 
based on age, race, or gender are less likely to have beneficial incentive effects. Rather, 
they merely have the effect of distributing the costs of such accidents among insureds 
on the basis of these characteristics. 
26
 For the origins of the concept, see KENNETH ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF 
RISK-BEARING (1971), and Bengt Hölmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 
BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979). For its relevance to law, see Kenneth S. Abraham, 
Distributing Risk (1986), and Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 237 (1996).  
27
 For a fuller discussion of the types of insurance regulation and their market-failure 
rationale, see Baker & Logue, Insurance Law.  In addition, to the extent liability law 
itself is vague or ambiguous, liability insurance companies and their representatives—
as translators of that law for their insureds—will have a tendency to encourage their 
insureds to reduce their legal risk not only by being more careful and thus reducing risk 
of harm to others (which is social welfare enhancing) but also by changing the way 
their behavior can be legally characterized and thus reducing liability risk without really 
reducing risk of harm to others.  See, e.g.,  Shauhin Talesh [article in this volume about 
EPLI] 
28
 Insurance contracts usually last for only one year.  As a result, any losses that the 
insured is likely to sustain in years after the policy has lapsed may be externalized, or 
ignored, by the current insurer.  This effect is limited with occurrence based liability 
10
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For all of these reasons, it obviously does not make sense to rely solely 
on insurers as regulators.  For some risks, government regulation is the only 
option.  For others, perhaps there is no regulatory solution.  But for some subset 
of risks, insurers’ incentives to minimize their insureds’ losses can be a useful 
supplement to government regulation.  Moreover, it is almost inevitable, so 
long as privately sold, individually underwritten insurance contracts are 
permitted.  That is, so long as there are risk-averse individuals and firms 
demanding insurance coverage, and so long as there are competitive insurance 
markets responding to that demand, insurers will have an incentive to reduce 
their insureds’ risk levels and thus they will regulate, subject to the 
qualifications listed above.  The point of this section has been to summarize 
why this role of insurance should be accepted, perhaps encouraged.   
There is a possibility, however, that existing tort law is indeed 
discouraging insurers from regulating, even when we should want them to.  In 
the process of doing research for another Article, I interviewed a number of 
officials at large property/casualty insurance companies, and some of them 
stated that they are reluctant to get too involved in the safety-related decisions 
of their insureds, because of the concern that by doing so they will expose 
themselves to tort liability.  This factual claim is impossible to verify without 
access to data that only the insurers have and that they are generally not willing 
to share with others.  The question that can be explored, however, is whether 
the claim that tort law discourages insurers from regulating is plausible.  That is 
the question taken up in the next Part. 
III. Current Law: The Tort of Negligent Inspection 
As it turns out, there is indeed a well settled doctrine within American 
tort law that insurers who engage in the active regulation of their insureds’ 
behavior, through inspection or standard setting or whatever, owe a duty of 
reasonable care to the insureds as well as to any other relying third parties.  To 
understand this rule, however, one must first understand the general no-duty-to-
rescue rule, to which the negligent inspection rule is an exception.  The no-
duty-to-rescue rule itself is very simple to understand:  There is no duty, 
generally, to volunteer to rescue another who is in danger.  So, if you come 
across a person who is drowning, whom you could easily help without taking 
any risk yourself (maybe you need only toss the person a life preserver or call 
911), tort law says that you may simply let the person drown, without lifting a 
finger or dialing for help.  To be sure, if you did that, you would be a jerk, and 
at least one jurisdiction within the U.S. might fine her $100 for such an 
egregious nonfeasance.
29
  But you would not be a tortfeasor in the eyes of the 
U.S. common law.
30
   
This general rule has several well-known exceptions.  For starters, if 
one party’s actions put another at risk of harm, the first party may have a tort-
based obligation to provide assistance to the second, assuming the first person 
was aware or should have been aware of her role in creating the risk.  In 
                                                                                                                                             
insurance, which puts the insurer on the hook for any current or future claim arising out 
of “occurrences” that take place during the policy period.  But even there, the insurer 
will tend to externalize post-policy occurrences. 
29
 Vermont’s Dut to Aid the Endageed Act, Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12, § 519(a). 
30
 The rule is different in a number of other countries. 
11
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addition, there are a number of “special relationships” that courts have 
recognized as creating a duty to take affirmative steps to prevent harm to 
others.  For example, courts have held that a common carrier owes something 
like a duty to rescue to its passengers, at least while they are in transit.  
Landowners traditionally owe a similar duty to invitees and licensees on their 
property.  In addition, some courts have even found that special relationships 
between two parties (A and B) can create a duty in one (A) to prevent the other 
(B) from harming a third party (C).  In such cases, the duty is owed, in sense, 
by A to C.  An example of this involves hospitals: in most jurisdictions, 
hospitals owe an obligation to take reasonable steps to prevent their patients 
from harming others.  Taking this exception a step further, in the famous 
Tarasoff decision, the California Supreme Court recognized an affirmative duty 
on the party of mental health professionals under certain circumstances to 
prevent their obviously dangerous patients from harming others.
31
  Many other 
jurisdictions have since adopted this rule as well. Again, these special-
relationship cases, to which we will return later in this Article, are important 
exceptions to the otherwise generally applicable no-duty-to-rescue rule.  
  The other (and final) exception to the no-duty-to-rescue rule takes us 
one step closer to the law governing insurers as regulators. It is the exception 
for voluntary undertakings. The quintessential example involves a failed rescue 
attempt.  Specifically, if a person voluntarily undertakes to render aid to another 
who is at risk (the drowning stranger, for example), then the would-be rescuer 
has a tort duty to exercise reasonable care in attempting the rescue. The rule 
makes some sense.  After all, if one person undertakes to make a rescue, other 
potential rescuers, seeing the first rescuer, may refrain from volunteering, 
which could make the rescuee’s situation even more perilous.  As a result, it 
isn’t crazy that someone who is undertaking to rescue another should be 
encouraged by tort law to do a reasonably good job of it.   (We will have more 
to say about the wisdom of all of these rules later in the Article.) 
  The negligent-undertaking rule was eventually extended to situations 
that include private regulation of risky activities, including private regulation 
by insurance companies of their insureds’ activities.  Under this rule, stated 
generically, if Party A undertakes, for pay or voluntarily, to provide services for 
Party B, which services are expected to reduce a risk facing Party C, then A 
owes a tort duty to C to exercise reasonable care, provided that either B or C is 
relying on A.
32
  This rule was tailor made to regulate private regulators.   
  Consider first the example of trade associations as standard setters.33  
Trade associations are nonprofits organized to represent the interests of firms in 
a particular industry. One important function of a manufacturing trade 
association is to promulgate product design and safety standards, which are 
then followed by manufacturers who are members of the trade association. A 
manufacturer’s failure to follow the privately promulgated standard product 
safety standards can result in tort liability for the manufacturer, as failure to 
                                                          
31
 Tarasoff v. The Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
32
 Restatement (Third) Torts § 43, with special emphasis on subsection (c). A similar 
rule is also in section 342A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
33
 The leading article on this topic is Ralph G. Wellington & Vance G. Camisa, The 
Trade Associations and Product Safety Standards: Of Good Samaritans and Liability, 
35 WAYNE L. REV. 37 (1988). 
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follow industry standards is considered relevant evidence of negligence or 
defective design. Therefore, such trade-association-promulgated standards can 
be understood as a form of direct private regulation, similar to the direct private 
regulation that insurers provide, as described above.
34
  
As a result of the negligent-undertaking rule described above, the 
promulgation of private standards of care can also subject the trade associations 
to tort liability.  For example, in King v. National Spa & Pool Institute, an 
industry association set standards governing the type of diving board that can 
be safely used in with swimming pools of various depths and sizes. The court 
there held that, because the trade association voluntarily undertook a duty to 
exercise due care in promulgating safety standards, it had a duty to do so with 
reasonable care.
35
  There are many other such cases.  Trade associations from 
the chemical industry, the blasting cap industry, the window treatment industry, 
the welding industry, among many others, have been found by courts to owe a 
duty of reasonable care to consumers when establishing industry standards of 
safety.
36
  The same duty has been applied to hospital associations and 
associations of state school boards and a whole range of other accreditation 
entities.
37
 Finally, under the auspices of the voluntary undertaking duty, 
numerous tort suits have been brought (and won) against the Underwriter’s 
Laboratory, the safety research and certification organization that provides 
safety standards and inspections for a wide range of products, ranging from all 
types of electronic devices and their component parts (wiring and whatnot) to 
fire extinguishers, smoke detectors, and other fire protection technologies.
38
   
Clearly tort law is being applied to encourage private standard setters to 
take reasonable care, and to hold them responsible for failing to take reasonable 
care, in setting private regulatory standards.  Tort law is also being applied in 
much the same way to insurance companies. In fact, my research assistants 
were able to find 171 reported negligent-inspection cases involving insurance 
companies, spread over 41 separate jurisdictions.  Of those cases, 107 involved 
workers’ compensation insurance, 33 involved some form of property insurance 
(often boiler-and-machinery or equipment repair insurance), and the remainder 
involved other types of insurance.  The remainder of this Part summarizes these 
cases, by type. 
It is no surprise that the vast majority of negligent-inspection-by-an-
insurer cases have to do with workers’ compensation coverage, for two reasons.  
First, anecdotal evidence suggests that workers’ compensation insurers are 
among the most active direct regulators of their insureds’ risky activities. 
Second, workers’ compensation remedies are less generous than traditional tort 
remedies, which means that the injured party in a workers’ comp setting is 
more likely to have losses that have not been compensated by insurance.   
                                                          
34
 See generally Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 543 
(2011) (making a similar point in the healthcare context, arguing for, among other 
things, a private-regulatory compliance defense where doctors sued for malpractice are 
following privately promulgated evidence-based guidelines). 
35
 570 So.2d 612 (Ala. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 578 So.2d 1285 (Ala. 1991). 
36
 See generally, Wellingon and Camisa, supra note __ (collecting cites). 
37
 Peter H. Schuck, Tort Liability to Those Injured by Negligent Accreditation 
Decisions, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 185 (1994). 
38
 Id. 
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The workers’ compensation negligent-inspection cases share a similar, 
and unsurprising, fact pattern: a worker, or a group of workers, is injured or 
killed in a workplace accident as a result of an unsafe work-place condition.
39
 
In these cases, in addition to the standard workers’ compensation claim that is 
brought against the employer, a lawsuit is brought by the injured victims 
against the workers’ compensation insurer, alleging that, prior to the accident, 
the insurer had inspected the workplace and, in effect, deemed it reasonably 
safe and that the employer-insured and the employees relied on this 
certification.
40
 In some of the cases there is evidence that the insurer had 
suggested safety enhancements that were in fact made, but in most of the cases, 
the evidence is unclear on this point, and the facts reveal only that the insurer 
had not raised objections to the condition of the workplace before the injury.
41
   
The key issue in many of the cases is the question of reliance.
42
 The 
insurer typically argues that the safety inspection was not made “for the 
benefit” of the employer-insured or for the benefit of the employees of the 
insured, but rather were exclusively for the benefit of the insurer. Specifically, 
                                                          
39
 See, e.g., Love v. Flour Mills of Am., 647 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1981) (grain elevator 
employees injured by explosion and fire); Adams v. Travelers Ins. Co., 494 So. 2d 401 
(Ala. 1986) (employee injured when roller on an inspecting machine snagged); Burns v. 
State Comp. Ins. Fund, 265 Cal. App. 2d 98, 71 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) 
(employee seriously injured at a sawmill that was negligently inspected by state 
agencies); Mimms v. Travelers Ins. Co., 156 Ga. App. 889 (1981) (employee injured 
when he fell off a piece of scaffolding from which safety rails had been removed); 
Jadosh v. Goeringer, 442 Pa. 451, 275 A.2d 58 (1971) (employee’s fingers crushed 
while operating a hydraulic ram of a lug cover press). 
40
 See, e.g., Phillips v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 813 F.2d 1173 (11th Cir. 1987) (employee 
injured by scaffolding on a construction site inspected by employer’s insurance 
company); Bartolotta v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1969) (employees 
exposed to argon gas after insurance company inspected employer’s factory and 
equipment); Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334 (Ala. 1980) 
(employees injured when sparks from tool caused an industrial fire after safety 
inspection undertaken by insurance company); Van Biene v. Era Helicopters, 779 P.2d 
315 (Alaska 1989) (employees killed in plane crash after insurance company 
negligently approved of working conditions allowing pilots to work longer than 
allowed by FAA regulations); and Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill.2d 69 
(1964) (seven employees killed and twelve employees injured when construction 
platform fell six stories after negligently inspected by insurance company).   
41
 See, e.g., Hill v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 428 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1970) (insurance 
company recommended that hotel fix hazards, which hotel relied upon to rectify 
hazards); Patton v. Simone, 626 A.2d 844 (Del. 1992) (insurance carrier supplied 
company with list of recommended improvements, which company made, that did not 
include elevator in violation of building codes). 
42
 See, e.g., Phillips v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 813 F.2d 1173 (11th Cir. 1987) (whether 
or not employer relied on insurer’s safety inspection is a jury question); Hill, 428 F.2d 
112 (insurance company created reliance by indicating they would carry out safety 
inspections); Kohr v. Johns-Manville Corp., 534 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (insurer 
can be held liable if inspections had been carried out negligently and then relied upon 
by employer); Ray v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 46 Mich. App. 647, 208 N.W.2d 610 
(1973) (whether or not employee relied on insurer’s safety inspections is a jury 
question); Derosia v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 155 Vt. 178 (1990) (insurer liable where 
employee relied on them for expertise in safety matters and where inspections are 
undertaken for benefit of the insured). 
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the insurer contends that it engaged in safety inspections solely to determine 
whether to offer the insurance and if so under what terms.
43
 The relevance of 
this fact, as mentioned above, is that, because the inspection was solely for the 
benefit of the insurer, no one else was or should have been relying on the 
inspection.  Some courts have found this argument and the evidence in support 
of it to be persuasive.
44
 Other courts, however, have found that, irrespective of 
whether the insurer was motivated primarily or even exclusively to minimize its 
own risk under the policy, if the insured or other third parties in fact relied on 
the insurer’s safety inspections, the insurer owes a duty of reasonable care.45  In 
all cases, the issue of reliance is crucial. 
In some of these workers’ compensation cases, the insurer seeks 
expressly to avoid negligent inspection liability by referring to language in the 
policy that explicitly disclaims any duty to the insured or to third parties in 
connection with the insurer’s inspections of the insured’s property or 
premises.
46
 This language, which is an obvious reference to the language found 
in both the Second and Third Restatements of Tort as well as in the negligent 
undertaking cases, is routinely enforced by some courts, irrespective of whether 
                                                          
43
 See, e.g., Manker v. Zurich Servs. Corp., 556 F. App’x 907 (11th Cir. 2014) (argued 
inspection only for purposes of underwriting assessment); Heath v. B.J. Hughes, Inc., 
431 So. 2d 68 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (argued inspection done for fulfillment of insurance 
contract, not for benefit of employees); Jansen v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of New York, 79 
N.Y.2d 867, 589 N.E.2d 379 (1992) (argued inspections carried out solely for 
underwriting process); Schultz v. Mills Mut. Ins. Grp., 474 N.W.2d 522 (S.D. 1991) 
(argued inspections carried out solely for insurer’s benefit). 
44
 See, e.g., Manker, 556 F. App’x at 909 (holding insurance company not liable where 
it “did not undertake to render services to another which it should have recognized as 
necessary for the protection of a third person or his things”); Heath, 431 So. 2d at 69 
(holding insurance company not liable where “policy language makes it clear that the 
inspections were made only in connection with the contract of insurance, and not for 
the benefit of the plaintiff.”); and Jansen, 79 N.Y.2d at 869, 589 N.E.2d at 380 (holding 
insurance company not liable where “it is apparent that safety inspections were 
undertaken solely for the defendant’s own underwriting purposes”). 
45
 See, Kohr v. Johns-Mannsville Corp., 534 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (“The 
completeness and accurateness of the studies which [the company] received from [the 
inspector] and their degree of reliance thereon are all material issues of fact obstructing 
summary judgment); Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp. 31 Ill. 2d 69, 79-80 (1964) 
(insurance company promoted safety inspections as benefitting company’s clients, 
which “fully negates any concept that defendant’s gratuitous inspections were solely for 
its own internal purposes”). 
46
 See, for example, the language from an old USF&G workers’ compensation policy, 
as quoted in Tomasich v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 470 So.2d 491 (La. 
Ct. App. 1985):  
The Company and any rating authority having jurisdiction 
by law shall each be permitted but not obligated to inspect at 
any reasonable time the work places, operations, machinery 
and equipment covered by this policy. Neither the right to 
make inspections nor the making thereof nor any report 
thereon shall constitute an undertaking on behalf of or for 
the benefit of the Insured or others, to determine or warrant 
that such workplaces, operations, machinery or equipment 
are safe or healthful, or are in compliance with any law, rule 
or regulation. 
15
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the employer-insured in fact acted in reliance on the insurer’s inspections.47  
Other courts have viewed such terms with more suspicion.  Some have 
enforced such terms only if there was in fact no evidence of reliance by the 
employer or the third party victim.
48
 Others have refused to enforce them at all, 
when third-party victims are involved.
49
  A few have declared such terms void 
as against public policy.
50
 
The second most common type of negligent inspection cases brought 
against insurers, after the workers’ compensation insurance cases, are disputes 
involving various types of property insurance, especially boiler and machinery 
coverage.
51
  This also is unsurprising, as insurers who offer boiler and 
machinery coverage heavily advertise their loss control expertise, which 
enhances the case for reliance.
52
  Boiler and machinery coverage is usually sold 
in a special policy, separate from and in addition to the more general property 
policy, by insurance companies that specialize, or have divisions that 
specialize, in such risks.  The coverage is typically first-party only and insures 
not only damage to the machinery itself but also any resulting business 
interruption or other lost income.
53
  The triggering event is the “breakdown” of 
                                                          
47
 Louisiana, for one example.  Id.; see also Leroy v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection 
& Ins. Co., 695 F. Supp. 1120, 1127 (1988) (court held insurance company not liable, 
following reasoning of Smith case below); Smith v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mich. 
685, 725, 303 N.W.2d 702, 715 (insurance policy disclaimed liability for inspections 
and court held “[t]he insurer was entirely justified in so limiting its liability.”); and 
Rosenhack v. State, 447 N.Y.S.2d 856, 860, 112 Misc. 2d 967, 971 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (“The 
facts clearly and unequivocally lead to the conclusion that this contract for insurance 
and particularly the provision dealing with inspection of the premises exclude 
claimant.”). 
48
 See, e.g., Bussey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 643 F.2d 1075, 1076 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(insurance company not liable because defendant “did not establish the requisite degree 
of reliance by himself or his employer on the insurer’s inspection services.”); Stacy v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1973) (upholding the policy language 
where there was no reliance by the insured or injured workman on the inspections made 
by the insurance company). 
49
 See, e.g., Sheridan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 3 Wash. 2d 423, 100 P.2d 1024 (1940); 
Van Winkle v. Am. Steam Boiler Co., 52 N.J.L. 240, 19 A. 472 (1890). 
50
 Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 752 F. Supp. 989 (D. Kan. 1990); find workers comp 
case to cite as well.[can’t locate a worker’s comp case on this issue] 
51
 See, e.g., Manker v. Zurich Servs. Corp., 556 F. App’x 907 (11th Cir. 2014); Howell 
v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1993); Hartford 
Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 201 F. 617 (7th Cir. 1912); 
Indus. Risk Insurers, Inc. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., CIV. A. 81-2635, 1990 WL 
28182 (E.D. La. Mar. 13, 1990); Mueller v. Daum & Dewey, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 192 
(E.D.N.C. 1986); Blalock v. Syracuse Stamping Co., 584 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Pa. 1984); 
Philadelphia Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Forge Co. 555 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Tex. 1982); 
A.O. Smith Corp. v. Viking Corp., 79 F.R.D. 91 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Hassan v. Hartford 
Ins. Grp., 373 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Del. 1974); Huggins v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 166 Ga. 
App. 441, 304 S.E.2d 397 (1983); Cleveland v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 163 Ga. App. 
748, 295 S.E.2d 190 (1982). 
52
 Example: https://www.travelers.com/business-insurance/specialized-
industries/boiler-machinery/risk-control.aspx.  
53
 See, e.g., https://www.travelers.com/business-insurance/specialized-industries/boiler-
machinery/docs/CP6943EMAX21.pdf; 
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the machine itself, and not some external force, such as fire or wind or water, 
which would be covered under the standard property policy.  Indeed, what has 
traditionally been called boiler and machinery insurance is now commonly 
called “equipment breakdown insurance.”54  Damages are typically limited to 
the cost of repairing or replacing the broken equipment along with associated 
lost income to the business—similar to business interruption coverage.55 
The standard fact pattern in a boiler/machine case is straightforward:  a 
boiler or some other large machine found on the insured’s business premises 
explodes and injures one or more individuals, a tenant or some other customer.  
The injured individuals then bring suit against the insurer that issued the policy 
covering the equipment in question.  The claim itself typically tracks the 
language of the sections of the Restatement dealing with negligent 
undertakings, the main issues again being the nature of the service provided by 
the insurer and whether that service was for the benefit of the insurer or the 
victims.
56
  Insurers lose as many of these cases as they win. 
Some types of insurance have given rise to very few if any negligent 
inspection lawsuits against insurers, presumably because insurers in those 
contexts are engaging in relatively little direct regulation—or perhaps because 
the sort of direct regulation that is being done produces relatively little 
likelihood of a negligence claim. For example, there are few cases involving 
homeowners’ insurance, and the cases that have been reported involve claims 
adjusting rather than pre-loss inspections and, in any event, have almost 
uniformly favored insurers (on reliance grounds).
57
  There are essentially no 
auto insurance cases.
58
  Neither of these is a surprise, under current law.  
Homeowners’ insurers do not inspect homes and provide certification of safety, 
                                                                                                                                             
http://www.zurichcanada.com/internet/can/SiteCollectionDocuments/Equipment-
Breakdown/Risk-topic2-BoilerandMachinery-insurance-Equipment-break-down.pdf;  
54
See, e.g.,  https://www.hsb.com/HSBGroup/Equipment_Breakdown_Basics.aspx; and 
http://www.nationwide.com/business-equipment-insurance-protection.jsp.  
55
 See, e.g., http://www.wrg-ins.com/Commercial/EquipmentBreakdown.aspx.  
56
 See, e.g., Howell v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 795 (6th 
Cir. 1993); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 201 F. 
617 (7th Cir. 1912); Riverbay Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 1988 WL 52783 
(S.D.N.Y. May 18, 1988); Philadelphia Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Forge Co. 555 F. 
Supp. 519 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Cleveland v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 163 Ga. App. 748, 
295 S.E.2d 190 (1982); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. White, 775 
N.E.2d 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Logestan v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. 
Co., 626 N.E.2d 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Van Winkle v. Am. Steam-Boiler Ins. Co., 
52 N.J.L. 240, 19 A. 472 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Seay v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 730 S.W.2d 
774 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).  In some cases, the issue turns on the interpretation of a 
statute.  For example, in Cassell v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 186 A.D.2d 1000, 588 
N.Y.S.2d 459 (1992), the court held that the insurer’s boiler inspection was for the 
benefit of the worker victims, rather than the insurer, because the inspection was 
conducted to satisfy a state labor law requirement. 
57
 See, e.g., GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 286 Ga. App. 852, 650 S.E.2d 424 
(2007); Hamill v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 2005 VT 133, 179 Vt. 250, 892 A.2d 226 
(2005). 
58
 The one exception that I could find was Ayers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 62 A.D.3d 635, 
878 N.Y.S.2d 190 (2009) (court holds that there is an issue of fact as to whether truck 
driver’s economic losses were caused by his auto insurers negligent inspection of his 
car). 
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in the way that workers’ compensation or boiler and machinery insurers do.  
Rather, the type of direct regulation that homeowners’ insurers provide tends to 
be very general and uncontroversial—the sort of clearly reasonable safety 
suggestions that, again, are supported by actuarial evidence and may be tied to 
premium discounts, but that is not likely to create a cause of action.  The same 
goes for auto insurers.  Giving premium discounts for safe driving, or for 
reducing the number of miles driven, is not a safety inspection or certification.  
It is not a certification that this activity is now safe.  Whether there might be 
more tort cases brought against homeowners’ and auto insurers if the duty were 
expanded is a different question. 
Unlike with auto and homeowners’ insurance, it is at least somewhat 
surprising that there are not more products liability insurance negligent-
inspection cases. In fact, we were able to find only one. In Deines v. Vemeer 
Manufacturing,
59
 the insured was a manufacturer of mechanical hay balers—a 
machine that cuts hay and then rolls into large bales.  The case arose out of a 
products liability suit brought against the manufacturer and the insurer by an 
individual whose arm got caught in the baler’s compression rollers and, as a 
result, later had to be amputated. The plaintiff alleged that his injury was 
caused by the unreasonably dangerous and defective nature of the design of the 
intake area of the baler, the operating manual, and the safety stickers on the side 
of the baler.   
During the relevant period the insured had purchased product liability 
coverage from a large property-casualty insurance company.  Part of the 
arrangement under that policy was that the insurer would inspect all of the 
equipment used by the insurer-manufacturer in making the balers.  The insurer 
also reviewed the design of the baler itself as well as the warning labels and 
operating manuals that the manufacturer sent with the bailers to the purchasers.  
After these inspections were done, the insurer made suggestions for how the 
manufacturer-insured might enhance the safety of the baler.  When making 
these inspections, the insurer deployed their loss prevention experts, who 
applied safety standards that had been adopted by various standard-setting 
industry groups—including the American National Standards Institute, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the American Society of 
Agricultural Engineers.  In addition to being a condition of coverage, the 
inspections were a selling point: part of the reason the insured manufacturer 
purchased products coverage with this particular insurer was to gain access to 
the insurer’s advertised loss control service, including the onsite safety 
inspections.  Indeed, the manufacturer-insured did not employ any safety 
engineers of its own, or conduct any safety inspections, because it was relying 
on those conducted by the insurer. 
The court, when evaluating the plaintiff’s tort claim against the insurer, 
applied each of the three prongs of the negligent undertaking rule from the 
Restatement quoted above.  The court held, first, that there was no evidence 
that the insurer’s inspection increased the risk beyond that which would have 
existed in the absence of the inspections.  Hence, there was, as a matter of law, 
no liability under prong (a).  However, the court then held that the insurer had 
in fact undertaken a duty owed to the plaintiff by the insured—that is, the duty 
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18
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 112 [2015]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/112
19 
 
of design reasonably safe products and the duty to warn of the risk of the 
product—and that the manufacturer-insured had relied on the insurer’s 
inspections being reasonable.  So there was liability, at least potentially, under 
prongs (b) and (c). 
The court rejected the insurer’s argument that the state’s product 
liability statute, which limits liability in various ways, applied to the case, 
concluding that the statute was not intended to eliminate negligent inspection 
liability.  In addition, the court held that the provision in the insurance policy 
that purported to eliminate any duty of reasonable care to third parties 
(including any duty that might arise out of the safety inspections) was void as 
against public policy.   
The Dienes-type situation likely happens with some frequency:   
liability insurers who specialize in products liability coverage, employing 
products liability law experts as well as experts in product design, 
manufacturing, and labeling, providing product-specific recommendations to 
relatively small manufacturing companies who do not have the resources to 
maintain such expertise in house.  Indeed, for the same reasons that workers’ 
compensation and boiler/machinery insurers often provide rigorous safety 
inspections, one would expect that product liability insurers to do the same.  
And again, there are product liability insurers who do some of this, as 
evidenced by their web advertising and by anecdotal evidence from my own 
interviews with insurers.  And yet, there are far fewer reported negligent 
inspection cases involving product liability insurance than there are involving 
workers’ compensation or boiler/machinery liability insurance.   
Some states, perhaps concerned that negligent inspection suits might 
result in higher premiums or withdrawal of coverage (or perhaps concerned that 
such suits will reduce insurer profits), have enacted statutes limiting the claims.  
Twenty states in fact have enacted statutes that appear to be designed to limit 
negligent inspection suits generally or to limit such suits against insurers in 
particular, or so the insurers argue.
60
  Some state courts have also sought to 
impose limits by interpreting existing statutes.  For example, courts in a few 
jurisdictions have applied the workers’ compensation statutes themselves, the 
ones that create the workers’ compensation regime in a state, to provide tort 
immunity for workers’ compensation insurers.61  Most courts, however, have 
                                                          
60
 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-53 (2014); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 23.30.055 (West 2014); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-485 (2014); CAL. INS. CODE § 11759 (West 2014); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-41-104 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2304 (West 2014); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.11 (West 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-11 (West 2014); IND. 
CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-2-6, 34-30-17-2 (West 2014); IOWA. CODE ANN. §§ 85.20, 88.6, 
517.5 (West 2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 167 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & 
EMPL. §9-509 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 418.131, 500.2925b (West 
2014); N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 
27-7-2, 27-8-15, 28-36-7 (West 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-108 (West 2014); TEX. 
LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001 (West 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 622, 624(h) (West 
2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.475 (West 2013).     
61
 See, e.g., Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1985); Johnson v. 
Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1977); Horne v. Sec. Mut. Cas. Co., 
265 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Ark. 1967); Barrette v. Travelers Ins. Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 1, 
246 A.2d 102 (Super. Ct. 1968); Jadosh v. Goeringer, 442 Pa. 451, 275 A.2d 58 (1971). 
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not so held.
62
  In any event, in the states in which a statute clearly protects 
insurers from negligent inspection liability, those statutes are enforced.  These 
statutes can be seen as a type of insurance-company-specific Good Samaritan 
statute.   
 
IV. Evaluating Alternative Tort Rules for Insurers as Private Regulators 
The full coverage scenario: when disclaimers should be enforced 
This Part examines the regulatory or incentive effects on insurance 
companies and their insureds of the existing doctrine of negligent inspection, as 
well as the effects of several alternatives to current law.  To provide a baseline 
for the analysis, observe that, if the insurer in question (the one doing the 
regulating) provides full coverage for the underlying loss, the optimal tort rule 
is probably the absence of any tort liability.  In such a situation, which all I will 
call the “full coverage scenario,” the insurer is contractually on the hook for the 
full amount of any such loss that arises.  In other words, there are either no 
policy limits or the limits are high enough to cover any conceivable loss.  In 
that scenario, at least in theory, there would be no regulatory benefit in 
providing injured victims with a tort cause of action against the insurer.  The 
incentives created by the insurance contract itself should be sufficient to 
motivate the insurer to take all reasonable steps to help its insured reduce its 
risks, through inspections or standard setting.
63
  Thus, the optimal rule in full 
coverage scenario, from the perspective of the effect on incentives, would be 
one of no liability.  Not coincidentally, a rule of no liability would also be 
desirable from the perspective of providing fair compensation, since the injured 
party, by assumption, is entitled to full compensation from the insurer.  For 
these reasons, in a full coverage scenario, if the insurance policy contains a 
term disclaiming or waiving any tort duty to on the part of the insurer to the 
insured, a strong argument can be made that such a term should be enforced by 
the courts.   
It is in the cases, and only in the cases, in which the policy issued by 
the regulating insurer is significantly less than the damages that can be 
recovered through a direct tort suit against the insurer for negligent 
inspection/regulation that tort law has any potential role.  This divergence 
between insurance coverage and the potential negligent inspection remedy can 
happen in two general situations.  First, there can be divergence when the 
insurance coverage in question does not cover the full losses that occur.   This 
type of divergence can happen with first-party insurance coverage (e.g., boiler 
and machinery policies that do not cover personal injuries) or with liability 
insurance coverage (e.g., products liability policies that have low policy limits).   
Second, in the case of liability insurance in particular, there can be divergence 
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 See, e.g., Bryant v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 1385 (6th Cir. 1970); Mays v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co, 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963); Stacy v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 334 
F. Supp. 1216 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Beasley v. MacDonald Eng’g Co. 287 Ala. 189, 249 
So. 2d 844 (1971); Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 148 Ga. App. 694, 252 
S.E.2d 199 (1979). 
63
 One qualification to this conclusion is that insurance contracts tend to be written on 
an annual basis.  Therefore, the contractual cost-internalization would be limited to the 
risks of a single policy year.  
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between the insurance coverage and the potential negligent inspection remedy 
when the underlying liability regime (the regime creating the liability for which 
insurance is purchased) has substantially limited remedies.  The primary 
example of this type of divergence involves workplace injuries, where the 
workers’ compensation regime provides a substantially smaller potential 
recovery than does a tort suit.  The remainder of this Part addresses both types 
of divergence situations. 
Divergence type I: less-than-full insurance and judgment proof 
insureds 
The less-than-full insurance coverage situation provides the strongest 
case for imposing a tort-based duty on insurers.  In the absence of such a tort 
duty, the insurer, in deciding how to regulate its insured (how rigorously to 
make its inspection, how detailed and comprehensive to make its safety 
recommendations, how insistent it should be about compliance with those 
recommendations), may be inclined to ignore any potential costs to third-party 
victims that exceed the amount of coverage contained in the insurance contract.  
Those additional costs, which are outside or above the coverage provided by 
the insurer, are simply not the insurer’s contractual responsibility.  As a result, 
there is an externality of sorts, or at least a potential externality, as the insurer 
externalizes those beyond-coverage costs to the insured.  
To see this point, consider an example in which a property insurer 
provides first-party equipment breakdown coverage for an insured’s boiler (for 
repair and replacement costs to the boiler in the event it breaks down) but no 
liability insurance coverage should the boiler explode. And for whatever 
reason, the insured has no separate policy providing liability coverage for such 
events—or liability coverage that expressly excludes harm resulting from 
exploding boilers.  Assume also that there is a substantial difference between 
the optimal boiler inspection for the purpose of avoiding breakdown of the 
boiler and the optimal inspection for the purpose of avoiding injury to persons. 
The externality concern is that, in the absence of a legal rule forcing the insurer 
to take into account the uninsured liability risk of the insured, the insurer will 
have an incentive to do only the property-risk inspection, and not the personal-
injury risk inspection, when in fact both types of inspections were called for.  
And the failure to conduct the personal-injury risk inspection may in fact lead 
to injuries to third parties.  Similarly, imagine a product manufacturer that 
purchases a products liability insurance policy with very low policy limits.  The 
liability insurer in that case might have an incentive to do only a cursory 
inspection, or none at all, given its relatively limited stake in the insured 
manufacturer’s risk of liability; and that inadequate or nonexistent inspection 
could lead to a design flaw that results in numerous injuries or deaths. In both 
of these situations, the insurer is externalizing the uncovered losses to the 
insured—the party that purchased the boiler policy or the products liability 
policy.   
A potential response to this conclusion is to suggest that there is in fact 
no externality.  That is, so long as the losses are borne by the insurer and the 
insured, those parties—who are already in a contractual relationship with each 
other—can negotiate to the efficient, Coasean outcome.  If it makes sense for 
the boiler insurer to do a personal-injury-type inspection of the boiler (as seems 
likely), then the insured can pay a somewhat higher premium to the insurer in 
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return for that service.  Likewise with the products liability example:  Even if 
the products liability insurer is providing only limited coverage, if the insured is 
potentially liable for any product-related injuries arising out of the use of its 
products, and if the insurer is in a better position (information-wise) to provide 
the product risk assessment than the insured itself is, the insured can contract 
for such services.  Moreover, the insureds in both examples will have an 
incentive to contract for such services.  As a result, market forces—together 
with the underlying tort duty of the insureds—internalize any potential 
externality. 
The externality in these cases returns, however, when the insured party 
is judgment proof.  A potential tort defendant is judgment proof when its assets, 
including its liability insurance coverage, are insufficient to pay for the harm 
that can be caused by its activities.
64
  When a party is judgment proof, tort 
law—ex post sanctions generally—have limited usefulness as a regulatory tool, 
because the misbehaving party cannot be forced to pay an amount that exceeds 
the value of its assets.  This is why some scholars argue that, when parties 
engaging in activities that pose risk to third parties are judgment proof, the 
preferred form of regulation is government-agency-based ex ante regulation.
65
  
Still, there are reasons to prefer ex post sanctions, and tort law in particular, 
over ex ante government regulation.  For example, ex post sanctions require 
significantly less information on the part of the regulator/court.
66
  To the extent 
such arguments in favor of ex post sanctions are persuasive, tort law has found 
ways to work around the judgment proof problem.   
The doctrine of vicarious liability is one example.  Vicarious liability 
holds one party liable for the torts of another under circumstances in which the 
first party either (a) is the cheapest cost avoider or, more importantly, (b) is one 
of the cheapest cost avoiders and has sufficient assets to be motivated by the 
threat of sanction.  The classic example is employer liability for the torts of its 
employees committed within the scope of their employment.  The idea is both 
that employers may be in the best position to prevent certain types of employee 
torts (in part because of information available only to the employer, and in part 
because the employer may have control over certain risky instrumentalities—
such as heavy machinery—that are also available to employees) and that the 
employer, unlike the employee, is not judgment proof.
67
     
Similar cheapest-cost-avoider plus judgment-proofness arguments have 
been deployed to justify a specialized form of vicarious liability known as 
“gatekeeper liability.”68  With gatekeeper liability, the party held vicariously 
liable is, obviously, the keeper of the gate; the party whose approval or 
certification is required by the party whose actions directly caused the harm.  
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 Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INTERNATIONAL REV. L. & ECON. 45 
(1986). 
65
 Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 
357 (1984).  
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 Id. 
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 Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L. J. 1231 (1984). 
68
 Renier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J. L. E. & O. 53, 57 (1986) (justifying gatekeeper liability in part because of 
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Maybe the most well-known examples of gatekeeper liability arise in the 
context of corporate financial shenanigans.  In such cases, by the time the harm 
is discovered, the parties who have been harmed (usually the parties who 
invested in the corporation without knowledge of the shenanigans) cannot 
recover for their losses from the defendant.  Similarly, ex post sanctions against 
the offending corporation are ineffectual when the company has gone into 
bankruptcy.  The Enron scandal is perhaps the most vivid example of this 
phenomenon, but the observation is more general:  in such situations, a regime 
of regulation that seeks only to punish the offending corporation after the fact 
may not be enough.   
For this reason, an argument can be made that the optimal regulator 
strategy in the context of corporate financial misbehavior includes, in addition 
to ex ante government regulation (SEC oversite), the extension of ex post 
liability beyond the corporation itself to the corporation’s lawyers, accountants, 
lenders, and underwriters.  These gatekeepers are all, in a sense, private 
regulators who have access to the relevant information regarding the 
corporation whose behavior needs to be regulated, private regulators whose 
stamps of approval are either legally or practically required for the regulated 
corporation to engage in the particular transactions that pose substantial risk to 
third parties (often to unsophisticated investors).
69
  Imposing a tort duty on 
these private regulators will encourage them to take reasonable care in 
determining whether to certify the books of the regulated corporations.  That is 
the regulatory effect of gatekeeper liability.  
All of these arguments—concerning vicarious liability generally and 
gatekeeper liability in particular—can be applied to insurers as private 
regulators of risk. In a sense, negligent inspection liability of insurers can be 
thought of as a specialized version of vicarious liability.  Empowering injured 
third-party victims to bring tort actions against the insurance company who 
failed to take reasonable care when doing a workplace inspection or product 
safety evaluation could have the same sort of beneficial incentive effects that 
respondeat superior has in the employment context: insurers could be induced 
to take steps to prevent accidents that their insured does not have sufficient 
incentive to prevent.  Imposing a tort duty on insurers could induce them to 
take into account costs that it might otherwise be ignored, as a result of the 
combination of inadequate coverage and a judgment proof insured.   
Moreover, insurers sometimes do act as gatekeepers, at least to some 
extent.
70
  The examples of home-mortgage lending and auto insurance were 
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 Id. See also Jay M. Feinman, Liability of Accountants for Negligent Auditing: 
Doctrine, Policy and Ideology, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 17 (2003); Assaf Hamdani, 
Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53 (2004). 
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 Others have emphasized the role of insurers as potential gatekeepers, especially in the 
context of corporate governance and financial disclosure. See, e.g., Joshua Ronen, Post-
Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance and GAAP Revisited, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. 
& FIN. 1 (2002); and Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial 
Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 413 (2004). 
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mentioned in the introduction, but there are others. Businesses cannot legally 
operate, for example, without workers’ compensation insurance coverage, 
which is mandatory in every state unless the business falls within certain 
statutory exceptions.  Similarly, most businesses would find it practically 
impossible to function without other forms of property/casualty insurance.  
Many product manufacturers, for example, may find getting a loan to be very 
expensive or even impossible unless they can provide proof of adequate 
products liability coverage.  Likewise, businesses that are heavily dependent on 
some piece of property—a building or a large, complex piece of machinery—
may have difficulty getting credit at reasonable rates without proof of insurance 
against the possibility of breakdown.  In such cases, when insurers function as 
gatekeepers, negligent inspection liability can be especially effective as means 
of internalizing costs externalized as a result of the judgment proof insured 
problem. 
Activity level effects 
When vicarious liability induces an employer to increase its monitoring 
and regulation of its employees’ risky activities, or gatekeeper liability 
incentivizes a financial auditor to increase its scrutiny of a corporation’s books, 
these can be understood as the “care-level effects” of such rules.  There are also 
“activity-level effects.”71 When an employer, for example, is made subject to 
tort liability for the torts of its employees, the employer’s costs are increased, in 
much the same way that its costs would be increased if a new excise tax were 
imposed.  As a result, the employer may end up hiring fewer workers or paying 
lower wages, or perhaps replacing some of its workers with contract labor in 
hopes of avoiding liability.  Similarly with gatekeeper liability, if corporate 
auditors, attorneys, and underwriters are made liable for the financial fraud of 
the corporations to whom they provide advice and whose integrity they certify, 
they (the gatekeepers) will raise their prices or cut back on the number of 
corporations they are prepared to certify or both.  Precisely how the costs will 
be divided between the employers and employees or between the gatekeepers 
and gatekeepees depends on the relative elasticities of supply and demand in 
the relevant markets.  But in any event, if the costs being imposed by vicarious 
liability are real costs that would otherwise be externalized, owing to judgment 
proof employees or agents generally, these activity level effects should tend 
towards efficiency. 
The same sorts of beneficial activity-level effects could arise when 
insurers act as regulators or gatekeepers.  Making the insurers subject to a 
potential tort suit for negligent inspection—just as exposing an accounting firm 
to the risk of liability for failure to perform a reasonable audit—is akin to an 
excise tax on insurers and can lead them to substantially increase their 
premiums, in some cases beyond a point that businesses are willing to pay.  The 
insurer will be forced by the threat of negligent inspection suits to raise the 
price of their coverage to account for potential payouts far in excess of the 
stated policy limits.  These negligent-inspection surtaxes are most likely to 
occur when the risks posed by the insured’s business activities far outstrip the 
value of the company’s assets.  (Think of hotels with significant risk of fire, 
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workplaces where employees are systematically exposed to dangerous 
conditions, or product manufacturers whose products could harm large numbers 
of consumers.)  In these situations, if insurance is effectively performing a 
gatekeeping function, some of these companies will be put out of business.  
That is, if they cannot persuade an insurer to provide them coverage at a 
premium they can afford—that the profits from their business can sustain—they 
will effectively be shut down.  That result would be efficient, at least in theory. 
Insurer withdrawal from regulation and the relative merit of carrots 
and sticks 
A potential difficulty with using tort law to encourage insurers to 
regulate reasonably, especially the currently the rule, is the possibility that, 
facing the prospect of such liability, insurers will regulate in a way that is 
designed to avoid liability or, worse, will stop regulating altogether. As to the 
first possibility, recall that under current law insurers can be held liable in tort 
for negligent inspection only if the insured or some third party relies on those 
inspections being done reasonably; if there is no reliance, there is no cause of 
action.
72
  In practical terms, what this means is that insurers will (and often do) 
insert language into their policies or promotional materials stating that any 
inspections or audits or other regulatory services are provided solely for the 
benefit of the insurer and are not to be relied upon by the insured or anyone 
else.  Such statements amount to disclaimers of liability, which courts 
sometimes enforce, sometimes not.   
The problem with this outcome, of course, is that, if insurance is to 
provide a useful regulatory function, there must be reliance.  When insurers are 
better evaluators of an insured’s risky activities than the insured is, reliance by 
the insured on the insurer’s recommendations is exactly what we want.  That is 
the point.  Thus, permitting insurers to get off the hook by proving the absence 
of reliance has the effect of discouraging insurers from engaging in potentially 
beneficial private regulation—the type that is relied upon by the regulated 
party.  
The more extreme response of insurers to the threat of negligent 
inspection suits is for insurers to stop inspecting, stop engaging in direct 
regulation, entirely.
73
  Again, under current law insurers can be held liable in 
tort for negligent inspection only if they “undertake” to provide inspection 
services.
74
  Thus, if they simply refrain from doing any sort of safety 
inspections, or decline to provide any “loss control” risk-reduction counseling 
services, to their insureds, they can essentially eliminate their chance of being 
held liable in tort for negligent inspection.   It is this sort of extreme withdrawal 
from regulation in response to the threat of liability that, according to anecdotal 
evidence, some insurers have been doing.   
                                                          
72
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One potential policy response to both types of insurer avoidance of 
their role as direct private regulator—their tendency to discourage reliance on 
their recommendations or to refrain from regulating at all—would be for more 
states to adopt what I have called insurer Good Samaritan statutes: laws that 
immunize insurance companies from lawsuits.  Such laws, by eliminating 
insurer liability, create a legal environment in which insurers would have 
freedom to engage in aggressive direct regulation of their insureds’ behavior, if 
that is called for, without fear of incurring tort liability far in excess of their 
policy limits.
75
  These statutes are obviously analogous to the better known 
Good Samaritan statutes in many states that protect certain individuals (usually 
limited to off-duty trained personnel, such as doctors and nurses) who 
voluntarily undertake to rescue those in imminent peril.
76
  Good Samaritan 
statutes generally, and insurer Good Samaritan statutes in particular, are a type 
of “carrot” approach to encouraging rescue: a positive reward to rescuers—a 
subsidy of sorts.
77
   
The limitation of this particular carrot approach, however, is again the 
problem of less-than-full coverage.  That is, with the threat of liability removed, 
it is true that insurers would no longer have an incentive to refrain from 
regulating their insureds or an incentive to discourage reliance on their 
recommendations—which amounts to the same thing.  Rather, insurers would 
have an unambiguous financial incentive to regulate, but their incentive would 
again be capped by the limits of their coverage, the amount that the insurer has 
on the hook if the insured suffers a loss.  For this reason, whether the adoption 
of an insurer Good Samaritan statute would on balance have beneficial 
incentive effects on insurer behavior would depend on a comparison of (a) the 
efficiency gains from those insurers who are induced by the statutory protection 
to engage in some useful regulation of their insureds by the elimination of the 
threat of liability with (b) the efficiency loss from those insurers who would 
have regulated in any event but who now, with the removal of the threat of 
liability, will regulate less effectively on account of the divergence between 
policy limits and amounts at risk of loss—the externality problem discussed 
above.   
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injury or death or other damage caused or alleged to have been caused by their failure 
to inspect, or negligent or incomplete inspection of, an employer's location, plant or 
operation for classification or rating purposes.” CAL. INS. CODE § 11759 (West). 
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How these two factors balance out in the real world presents the 
quintessential “difficult empirical question.”  My own intuition is that, all 
things considered, factor (a) is probably larger than factor (b), which means the 
adoption of insurer Good Samaritan statutes would be a sensible 
recommendation.  However, if we consider tweaking the standard insurer Good 
Samaritan statute, we might be able to achieve an even better outcome, in terms 
of the overall effect on incentives.  Consider the possibility of adding one 
additional element to those statutes:  make the insurer’s freedom from tort 
liability contingent on a finding by a court (presumably upon a motion by an 
insured to dismiss a negligent inspection case brought against it) that the 
amount of insurance involved in the case was adequate to cover the risk posed 
by the insured.  Such a contingency would give insurers an incentive to make 
sure that insureds are purchasing adequate coverage, which would push things 
closer to the full coverage situation described above, where tort law would not 
be necessary to encourage optimal direct regulation by insurers.    This solution 
would of course present additional complexities, perhaps the most difficult 
being how to define “adequate” coverage.  But that question could left either to 
the courts (in individual negligent inspection cases), to the insurance regulators 
(who could promulgate standards of adequate insurance), or to state 
legislatures. 
A critic at this point might have the following complaint.  If higher 
insurance policy limits is the ultimate goal of this reform proposal, why not 
simply propose that state legislatures impose insurance mandates in areas where 
they have not yet done so and increase the limits in areas where mandates 
already exist but are too low.  Once those are adopted, we would be close to a 
full-coverage scenario, and the need to impose a tort duty on insurers to 
regulate would be eliminated. There is something to be said for this argument.  
Many scholars have suggested mandatory liability insurance as a response to 
the judgment proof problem generally.
78
 Likewise, broader use of, and more 
beefed up, insurance mandates could be a solution to this version of the 
judgment proof problem as well.  However, expanding the use of legislative 
insurance mandates is likely to be politically unpopular; whereas, the sort of 
statute envisioned in the text is not quite as intrusive as an actual insurance 
mandate.  Insurers could still opt not to provide full coverage and simply risk 
the possibility of a negligent inspection suit.  Moreover, at least in those states 
that do not currently have any insurer Good Samaritan statute, the adoption of 
the modified form that I am suggesting could be seen as a compromise—a 
middle position between no liability limiting statute (the status quo) and a new 
liability limiting statute that encourage (but doesn’t actually mandate) higher 
policy limits.  
The alternative, and considerably more radical, policy response to 
insurers’ reluctance to regulate—or their withdrawal from regulation, if that is 
happening—would be to eschew the (modified) carrot of (contingent) freedom 
from tort liability for the unambiguous stick:  an affirmative duty to regulate.  
The idea would be to penalize those insurers who fail to regulate when they 
should by imposing on them a duty in tort to affirmatively engage in direct 
                                                          
78
 See, e.g., Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, supra note __; and Peter J. Jost, 
Limited Liability and the Requirement to Purchase Insurance, 16 INTERNATIONAL REV. 
L. & ECON. 259 (1996). 
27
Logue:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2015
28 
 
regulation of their insureds’ behavior when doing so is reasonable.  Such a duty 
to regulate would clearly be a departure from current law.  Moreover, it would 
arguably be inconsistent with the approach the law has taken to affirmative 
obligations in other contexts.  The most obvious example is the general no-
duty-to-rescue rule mentioned in the introduction.  And the arguments that have 
been made in defense of that rule would apply as arguments against a duty to 
regulate rule here. For example, William Landes and Richard Posner have 
pointed out adopting an affirmative duty to rescue would encourage potential 
rescuers to avoid situations in which they might be called on to rescue.  Picture 
off-duty doctors, nurses, and EMT workers avoiding swimming pools and 
public beaches.
79
    
What is the analog in the insurance context?  Insurance companies 
refusing to offer insurance coverage to certain insureds, for fear of being held 
liable in tort for failing to regulate every time there is a loss claim?  That is, it is 
one realistic possibility.  Some insurers may well decline coverage for some 
insureds.  Other insurers, however, may continue to insure, but instead start to 
engage in active regulation to minimize their risks.  Almost certainly insurers 
would respond by pricing their coverage to include the risk of a duty-to-
regulate lawsuit.  Perhaps even more likely, insurers might both raise their 
prices and insist on higher policy limits; if they are going to be taking on the 
risk of being held liable for amounts beyond their existing policy limits anyway 
(under and affirmative duty to regulate), they might as well raise their policy 
limits and their prices.  This change would again move us towards the full-
coverage scenario, where the negligent inspection tort suit would be rendered 
irrelevant.   
Note also that imposing an affirmative obligation on insurers to 
regulate would not be totally without precedent.  Recall the various “special 
relationship” exceptions to the general no-duty-to-rescue rule mentioned above.  
The idea of imposing this obligation on insurers would be to treat the 
insurer/insured relationship as being more akin to the business-premises-
owner/business-guest relationship, the employer/employee relationship, or even 
the teacher/student relationship.
80
  A primary reason for these special 
relationship exceptions is that they provide a way to draw administrable lines in 
deciding who is potentially liable under this affirmative duty to help. That is, 
whereas it would be quite burdensome, on the affected parties and on the 
judicial system, to have an unrestricted affirmative duty to rescue, a rule that 
applies only to parties in certain categories of special relationships is narrower, 
less burdensome generally, and easier for courts to apply.  Imposing an 
affirmative duty on insurers to provide regulatory advice to their insureds when 
it is reasonable to do so could be seen as another example of a special 
relationship. 
But let’s not kid ourselves.  Imposing a new affirmative tort duty on 
insurers to engage in “reasonable inspections” when it is “reasonable to do so” 
would be highly controversial.  What’s more, it would, if it works, produce a 
result not entirely different from the modified (adequate-policy-limit-
contingent) version of the insurer Good Samaritan statute that I suggested 
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above.  Both reforms would tend to push up the amount of coverage offered by 
insurers, thus helping to align the inspection/regulation incentives of insurers 
with those of society.  The latter reform, however, would have two big 
advantages over the former.  First, it would be less of a departure from current 
law, and, as a political matter, less of an apparent imposition of costs on 
insurers, for the reasons described above. Second, it would less direct 
regulation by courts of the business of insurance than does the duty to regulate.  
That is, if the insurer modified Good Samaritan statute works as planned, there 
would rarely be a need for courts to hear negligent inspection cases against 
insurers, assuming insurers write policies with adequate coverage, since the 
insurers would be immune.  By contrast, under the affirmative duty to regulate 
approach, courts would continually be called on to second guess insurer’s 
regulatory judgments—both whether to regulate and how—a task for which 
courts are not necessarily well suited.
81
  This is of course not a critique unique 
to tort suits against insurance companies for what amounts to negligent risk 
regulation. To the contrary, negligent-based tort cause of action that involves 
complex and technical issues of engineering and science present difficulties for 
courts.  (Risk-utility analysis in product design defect cases are similarly 
difficult for courts.)  The point is that the critique would be less applicable to 
the insurer Good Samaritan statute alternative. 
Divergence type II: the workers’ compensation example 
I noted above that negligent inspection liability against insurers only 
makes sense, even potentially, as a regulatory tool in situations in which the 
insurer provides less than full coverage.  That is, there must be a divergence, a 
gap, between the insurance coverage and the potential negligent inspection 
remedy.  Until now, I have been discussing situations in which the gap arises 
because the insured for market reasons, or for reasons having to do with being 
judgment proof, purchases less full coverage for the losses its activity might 
cause.  There is another source of coverage gap, which applies primarily to 
workers’ compensation insurance but could apply to any situation where the 
underlying liability regime (the regime creating the liability for which insurance 
is purchased) provides remedies for injured victims that are substantially less 
than those available through a tort claim.   
Consider the workers’ compensation example.  When a worker is 
injured on the job, she does not have a traditional tort claim against her 
employer, even if she can prove that his employer’s negligence caused his 
injury.  As a result of state workers’ compensation statutes, many of which 
were enacted in the early part of the Twentieth Century, a worker’s remedies 
are limited to partial recovery for medical expenses, lost income, and vocational 
rehabilitation cost, all of which may be subject to a cumulative cap.
82
  Note, 
then, that under a typical workers’ compensation regime today (perhaps under 
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all of them), neither pain-and-suffering damages nor punitive damages may be 
recovered by the injured worker.
83
  Contrast that outcome with the traditional 
tort remedies available in non-workplace settings.  Those remedies include 
unlimited recovery for compensatory damages, including pecuniary (medical 
expenses, lost income, and the like) as well as nonpecuniary damages (pain and 
suffering) and, at least potentially, punitive damages.  
Given this divergence, a proponent of tort liability as a regulatory tool 
might initially argue that the negligent inspection suit provides an especially 
useful regulatory tool for improving workplace safety.  Since workers’ 
compensation remedies do not include some of the real costs associated with 
workplace injuries (yes, pain and suffering is a real cost), the threat of workers’ 
compensation damages does not give employers sufficient incentive to maintain 
workplace safety.  Imposing tort liability on workers’ compensation insurers 
when they fail to do a reasonably effective workplace inspection, which results 
in an injury to a worker, serves a useful cost-internalizing function.   
Critics of tort law as a mode of regulation would have a number of 
familiar responses to this line of argument.  Jury awards in tort cases, especially 
pain-and-suffering damage awards, are inaccurate and wildly inconsistent, or so 
they would say.  They would also point out that people do not generally 
purchase first-party insurance coverage for purely non-economic losses.  Why 
is that fact relevant?  If true, it would mean that when tort law forces insurers to 
raise their premiums to cover the possibility that they might be held liable, 
through a negligent inspection lawsuit, for the pain-and-suffering damages of 
some unfortunate person, the law will be making insureds pay for a type of 
insurance that they do not want.  Finally, these critics would likely note that the 
main point of workers’ compensation laws was to eliminate the inconsistencies 
and excesses of tort liability (including pain-and-suffering damages) in 
exchange for the elimination of several defenses that employers had at in 
common tort cases, such as the fellow servant rule.  To permit injured third 
parties to recover pain-and-suffering damages from insurers for breach of the 
duty to provide reasonable inspections, when the same injured parties cannot 
sue the insured-employer directly for the same damages, undermines the 
political and pragmatic compromise represented by the workers’ compensation 
law reforms.
84
 
The problem with the argument is that it gives greater scope to the 
workers’ compensation compromise than may be warranted.  Although 
workers’ compensation laws were intended to limit remedies that employees 
have against their employers for workplace injuries, they were not intended to 
limit employees’ remedies against everyone.  For example, if an employee is 
injured in the workplace by a product, some large piece of equipment or 
machinery, say, that employee can bring a products liability claim or a 
negligence claim against the product manufacturer in addition to their workers’ 
compensation claim.  And the damages available in the products liability case, 
of course, in most jurisdictions still include pain-and-suffering damages.  
What’s more, this side-by-side coexistence—of the traditional tort remedies 
against product manufacturers and the more limited remedies against the 
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employer—is not considered problematic, at least as a legal matter.  Product 
manufacturers were clearly not a part of the big bargain that produced the 
workers’ compensation regime, and they are not protected by workers’ 
compensation statutes.
85
  Likewise, workers’ compensation insurers were not 
part of that grand bargain.  That is, at the time the workers’ compensation 
statutes were originally enacted, although the lawmakers contemplated that 
workers’ compensation liability insurers would provide workers’ compensation 
policies to employers to cover the damages that employers would be required to 
pay, there is no evidence that they intended to limit independent tort remedies 
against workers’ compensation insurers who fail to take reasonable care when 
providing services to the insureds.  Frankly, lawmakers were probably not 
thinking about that particular issue.  As a result, it is no surprise that most, 
though not all, courts that have addressed the question have held that workers’ 
compensation statutes themselves, the ones that created the workers’ 
compensation regimes, do not themselves immunize workers’ compensation 
insurers from negligent inspection liability.
86
 
Whether negligent inspection suits should be available against workers’ 
compensation insurers, then, turns not on factors specific to workers’ 
compensation coverage, but rather on the issues discussed above in connection 
with other types of insurance: the extent to which the presence of such suits is 
likely to discourage insurers from inspecting at all and whether that effect 
would be greater or less than the effect of the rule on the quality of the 
inspections.  Unlike with other types of insurance, where the problem boiled 
down to insufficient coverage and the solution was to find a way to encourage 
insurers to offer full coverage, with workers’ compensation the amount of 
liability and the amount of insurance coverage are both determined by statute 
and regulation.  Therefore, the only way to increase the coverage, and thereby 
to eliminate the need and motivation for the negligent inspection suits, would 
be to reform workers’ compensation regimes generally to provide greater 
damages, including pain-and-suffering damages.  Or we go do the reverse and 
reform tort law to be more like workers’ comp.  Either approach would likely 
eliminate the need for what amounts to vicarious liability suits against insurers. 
Conclusion 
Insurers have access to information that puts them in the ideal position 
to be effective private regulators of their insureds’ risky activities.  And they 
have exceptionally effective regulatory tools.  Nothing motivates someone to 
change their behavior like a financial reward, in the form of a premium 
discount.  And when insurers control access to certain domains of the 
economy—either because of legal or practical requirements—the ability to 
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withhold coverage can induce insureds to follow the insurer’s recommendation 
for how to reduce potential losses.  Moreover, because insurers are bonded to 
the interests of their insureds, as a result of their contractual obligation to pay 
the insured’s claims, insurers are motivated to find ways to minimize insured 
losses.  For all these reasons, if tort law, in particular if the existence of 
negligent inspection lawsuits by insureds against insurers, is discouraging 
insurers from engaging in some types of direct regulation of their insureds’ 
behavior, perhaps some insurers need some additional encouragement. This 
Article has argued that a modified carrot approach to providing such 
encouragement, where insurers are given immunity from tort liability if they 
demonstrate adequate coverage amounts, might be superior to a more radical 
stick approach, which would take the form of an affirmative duty to regulate. 
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